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Paul Ricœur’s Freedom and Nature was his first significant and original contribution to 
philosophy. As a result, scholars on his thought have often looked to the book as a source for his 
later developments, and only rarely as a work worthy of consideration on its own. This is 
unfortunate because the book addresses significant philosophical problems, including how 
cognition is embodied, mind-body dualism, freedom of the will, and responsibility. It also 
develops several points of interest to the broader tradition of Continental philosophy, including a 
new account of intentionality and a new approach to the philosophy of life. It is to correct for this 
neglect that Scott Davidson, the editor of the volume, thought the book was needed (p. viii.) 
This double motivation, one which is “internal” and takes as its focus the state of 
Ricœurian scholarship and phenomenological hermeneutics, and one which is “external” and 
addresses the broader problems of philosophy, thus sets a basic standard for evaluating the 
success of the volume: can it meet its own stated goals? 
I think it does, and so anyone who is interested in Ricœur’s thought or the problems 
noted above, mind-body dualism, freedom of the will, embodied cognition, or the character of 
conscious intentionality, will be well served by consulting these essays. The contributions to the 
volume are uniformly excellent, addressing key topics and historical sources to inform analysis at 
each turn. 
There is always something which a single volume cannot address, and at the end of this 
review I assess what I wish could have been included in the volume, but since the subject matter 
is complex, I think it most helpful to begin with a review of its structure. As the title suggests, this 
is a companion volume so that it is divided into three parts: Part I: Historical Influences, meant to 
situate Freedom and Nature among its relevant philosophical sources, Part II: Key Themes, which 
reviews several of the primary problems which the work addresses, and Part III: New 
Trajectories, which takes up how Ricœur’s thought may bear on contemporary philosophical 
discussions. My review follows exactly this path. 
Part I: Historical Influences 
One might be forgiven for thinking that Part I might be of interest only for scholars of 
Ricœur or the tradition of phenomenological hermeneutics, but that would be a mistake. In 
chapter one, “Ricœur and Merleau-Ponty: From Perception to Action,” Marc-Antoine Vallée 
assesses how Ricœur develops Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception by taking that 
approach into a phenomenology of the will and action. “I want to show,” he writes, “that this 
change in perspective requires a broadening of our primary understanding of intentionality” (p. 
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3.) The problem, in brief, is that the intentionality of an action just cannot be of the same sort as 
that involved in perception or contemplation. The latter characterizes our consciousness of a 
matter, but the former is consciousness to do something or other. Beyond providing a nuanced 
account of the historical influences on Ricœur’s thought, then, Vallée’s essay provides the 
phenomenological grounds for the difference between theoretical and practical reason. At the 
same time, it suggests why projects, such as Merleau-Ponty’s early work, are not the right sort of 
model for all of human consciousness, and why they are likely to result in mistaken conceptions 
of human freedom. 
Jean-Luc Amalric’s contribution, “Act, Sign and Objectivity: Jean Nabert’s Influence on 
the Ricœurian Phenomenology of the Will,” is the second chapter of the volume. His aim is to 
uncover how Nabert’s distinction between act and sign informs the content and method of 
Freedom and Nature, but he also provides an argument against naturalistic, monist positions with 
respect to the mind-body problem. With respect to the point of influence, recall that for Nabert 
the act of existing always produces an object, which is meaningful, i.e. as, indicated by signs. 
Because our conscious acts are completed in their objects, they are constitutively signified. As a 
result, the understanding of our own acts must always proceed by way of interpreting the signs 
into which they are objectified. This insight, Amalric shows, informs both the content of Ricœur’s 
discussion of motive, which starts in consciousness and yet is prompted by objects in our natural 
environment, and Ricœur’s method in Freedom and Nature, which follows a ternary process that 
addresses what is voluntary, what is involuntary, and their synthesis (p. 29.) The upshot of the 
discussion is to articulate a new argument against simple accounts of mind-body monism, what 
might be called the symmetrical explanation problem: any (naturalist) causal argument that 
intelligibly connects to the lived experience of the will must, by virtue of this connection, allow 
one to take up the reverse course in explanation. It is this insight that stands at the heart of 
Ricœur’s claim that it is only the relation of the voluntary and involuntary that is intelligible, and 
not the terms themselves. 
In “Ravaisson and Ricœur on Habit,” the third chapter of the volume, Jakub Čapek takes 
up this reciprocal relationality in a specific case: habit. The essay addresses not only how 
Ravaisson’s work Of Habit influences Ricœur, but the challenge it poses for Freedom and Nature. 
For Ravaisson, habit has absolute autonomy, which entails that habituated activity may occur 
without our being aware of those activities. It follows, a fortiori, that habituated activity may 
occur without guidance by reasons. Ricœur develops Ravaisson’s observations in a way that 
habit has only a relative autonomy. This entails that all actions that are habitual can be guided by 
reasons. At base, for Ravaisson, habit is a model for being, while for Ricœur habit is a capacity, 
something that we have and not something that we are. Given these differences, Čapek 
tentatively concludes that Ricœur might have done better to take up Ravaisson’s approach, rather 
than limit habit to the side of the involuntary, since in that way habit might have been the 
relation itself between the terms of the voluntary and involuntary. Ricœur, of course, resists this 
suggestion because then the fundamental relation that we are would not be a reasonable one. 
Čapek’s essay nevertheless points out an interestingly different way one could develop Ricœur’s 
own stated project. 
Michael Sohn’s chapter “The Influence of Aquinas’s Psychology and Cosmology on 
Ricœur’s Freedom and Nature” serves as the last contribution to part one. It argues that all three 
 Review 
 
 
Études Ricœuriennes / Ricœur Studies     
Vol 9, No 1 (2018)    ISSN 2156-7808 (online)    DOI 10.5195/errs.2018.434    http://ricoeur.pitt.edu  
110 
projected volumes of The Voluntary and Involuntary offer “a contemporary philosophy of the will 
that retrieves the classical problem of the voluntary and involuntary, particularly as it was 
elaborated by Aquinas” (p. 64.) Freedom and Nature more specifically fits questions 6 to 17 of the 
Prima Secundae of the Summa Theologiae, and Fallible Man and The Symbolism of Evil follow the 
problematic after question 18, which introduces the problem of evil. Within this general retrieval, 
Sohn shows how Ricœur, who follows Jean Laporte’s interpretation of Aquinas, criticizes 
Aquinas’ general cosmological view of the will. This is the view, which supposes that the end of 
the will, the good as God, is naturally given, so that there is a natural hierarchy of ends for 
human life. This view is, for Ricœur, a theological sort of determinism. Nevertheless, Ricœur 
retrieves Aquinas’ conception of the will in its deliberation about indeterminate means to that 
end. The external interest of this discussion should be clear even for the non-theologically 
inclined, for it bears directly on the contemporary discussion of natural goodness, as one finds it, 
e.g., it in Philippa Foot (2001) or Rosalind Hursthouse (1999.) 
Part II: Key Themes 
The second part of the anthology addresses a few of the key topics in Freedom and Nature, 
and Michael Johnson’s “The Paradox of Attention: The Action of the Self upon Itself,” provides a 
nice transition into this systematic discussion by drawing on some of the same historical sources 
Sohn uses, namely Aristotle, Aquinas and Descartes. The problem addressed is an old one: how 
are we to understand deliberation’s role in practical reason? Specifically, is there a pattern of 
reasoning to explain all intentional action? Moreover, what does it mean to act for a reason? The 
intellectualist tradition (from Aristotle) argues both (1) that our decision or choice is responsive to 
reasons, and that (2) the choice itself is nothing other than being maximally responsive to reasons. 
The existentialist tradition argues that (1) choice is not responsive to reasons (in fact, choosing for 
reasons is inauthentic for Sartre), and (2) that choice is its own sort of activity, a positive event. 
Johnson shows how Ricœur successfully integrates insights from both traditions, holding (1) that 
choice is responsive to reasons, and (2) that it is still its own sort of event. He does this by 
showing how in both cases it is a sort of attention: attention to reasons, and attention to see the 
reasons through, i.e., as effort. The discussion shows Ricœur’s novelty in this field, and since it is 
overlooked by even careful contemporary accounts of practical reason (e.g. Audi 2006), it 
deserves to be considered more broadly. 
Chapter six, Johann Michel’s “The Status of the Subject in Ricœur’s Phenomenology of 
Decision,” not only provides an enviously clear account of the whole structure of Ricœur’s 
Freedom and Nature, but also tackles perhaps the question of human subjectivity: how do I know 
that I am, that I exist? At least that might be the Cartesian formulation of the question. In 
Ricœur’s terms, the problem is that I do not appear to my own conscious intentions as their 
object, since I am always aware of something else. The Cartesian tradition attempts, as a result, to 
catch the subject as the object of its intentions in some special cases, say in labor (Marx) or the 
struggle for recognition (Hegel), or simply gives up on the notion (Hume.) Ricœur instead argues 
that at “the moment of decision, I am part of what I project, or rather, I am what I project” (p. 
116.) Although my decision is absorbed in its objects, i.e., possible courses of action, in its 
execution it is I who act. The “I” is both pre-reflexively implicit in this activity, and is 
appropriately imputed to the action if it is a voluntary action. The Ricœurian subject, then, is the 
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subject of imputation, one that we know in our actions and the meaning of those actions, rather 
than a substratum supposedly underlying my conscious activity. This is why Ricœur will later 
write (in Oneself as Another) that its unity is a task, not a given. Michel’s essay brings out the 
fundamentally different approach Ricœur takes in answering the basic question of human 
subjectivity, and its relevance to the discussion of personal identity ought to be clear from just 
these few remarks.  
Chapter seven is Eftichis Pirovolakis’ essay “Volo, ergo sum: Ricœur Reading Maine de 
Brian on Effort and Resistance, the Voluntary and the Involuntary,” which presents a critique of 
Ricœur’s goal in Freedom and Nature from the Derridian point of view. Ricœur’s general purpose 
in Freedom and Nature is to provide an account of the relationship of the voluntary and the 
involuntary, such that the latter is constitutive of the former by playing a mediating role; they are 
not opposed but complementary notions for Ricœur. Following Derrida’s reading of Maine de 
Brian in On Touching—Jean-Luc Nancy, Pirovolakis provides what is, I think, the standard 
Derridian critique of Ricœur, which is that it is not radical enough. Ricœur, he argues, is not 
willing to acknowledge that “something involuntary and radically other … could disrupt the 
unity and certitude of the ego’s transcendental sphere” (p. 132.) The decision to include the 
criticism is thus useful to the reader to appreciate how the volume contributes to an ongoing 
discussion in Continental philosophy about the aims of metaphysical reflection, and Pirovolakis 
makes the case clearly (for those frustrated by Derrida’s style.) Having written several pieces on 
this debate myself, I (still) think that the Derridian response misunderstands Ricœur’s purpose in 
important ways (cf. Purcell 2010, 2012, 2013.) Nevertheless, the debate is a good one to include in 
the volume, as it continues to be relevant to the broader discussions of Continental philosophy. 
Habit plays a significant role in Freedom and Nature because Ricœur treats it both as an 
involuntary feature of the human will and as the point of connection between the voluntary and 
the involuntary. Grégori Jean’s essay “On Habit,” which is the eighth chapter of the volume, 
addresses the topic in a careful way. Initially, the essay takes up the way in which habit might be 
a model for the relation of the mind and body. Are habits mechanical, i.e., fully autonomous and 
unguided by reasons, or not? But Jean leads this question back to the broader backdrop, which 
underpins the “hermeneutics” of Freedom and Nature. No, Jean shows, habits are not fully 
mechanical, and Ricœur’s reasons for this claim largely turn on the way that habits enact our 
motives but do not create them. Yet this account of habit, one which functions as a ground for our 
capacities, ends up changing our understanding of nature as a result. On this new sense, nature 
must be understood both as mystery, since our bodies are not fully comprehensible, and as the 
broader horizon in which we must act, as natura naturans in Spinoza’s thought, since our bodies 
are but part of nature. What a focus on habit shows, then, is not only that we are not 
unreasonably determined by our bodily situation, but also that our capacities nevertheless 
emerge from a pre-comprehensive mystery, nature, as our final horizon of action. What is at 
stake, then, is the meaning of the hermeneutics, since on Jean’s approach it is nature, which is our 
final horizon and not Heidegger’s world. His conclusion, in short, is that we are Beings-In-
Nature, and not Beings-In-The-World. 
The ninth chapter, “The Phenomenon of Life and Its Pathos,” rounds out the second part 
of the volume and develops the topic of nature in Ricœur’s thought. In the essay Scott Davidson 
notes that a variety of philosophies of life, of vitalisms, have received a renewed attention in 
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contemporary Continental philosophy, in the work of Henry, Barbaras, Jonas, Foucault, or 
Agamben for example. Yet Ricœur has not been included in this discussion. What Davidson 
proposes, then, is to show both that Ricœur has a robust philosophy of life, especially as one finds 
it in part III of Freedom and Nature, and that it is a significant contribution to the discussion. With 
respect to this last point, Davidson makes the case that unlike many other approaches, Ricœur 
refuses to define life by its freedom alone, but rather proposes a notion that takes life to be 
defined through a relationship with what necessitates our actions, the involuntary. As a result, 
Ricœur’s account is not only more aptly fit to our lived experience, but it avoids the paradoxes 
that might emerge from a one-sided approach to human freedom. Here again the implications for 
broader discussions in Continental philosophy, those views on the philosophy of life, are 
especially pertinent. 
Part III: New Trajectories 
In chapter ten, Natalie Depraz begins the discussion for the use of Ricœur’s thought in 
new philosophical research. In “A Descriptive Science of First-Person Experience: For an 
Experiential Phenomenology” she makes the case that Ricœur’s “descriptive method” as outlined 
in the general introduction to Freedom and Nature is neither an existentialist method, nor an 
hermeneutical method—whether one understands “hermeneutics” in a exegetical sense (for 
Biblical scholarship), as a result of human facticity (Heidegger), or as the condition for 
intersubjective dialogue (Ricœur’s late work.) What she proposes is that his approach might be 
used to develop an experiential phenomenology, one which is radically first-personal. She 
explains that by “radically” in the first-person she means “to speak on the basis [for example] of 
the position of the researcher who takes him or herself as the subject” (p.183.) Her approach thus 
includes the entire first person, abandoning the ideal of producing claims that would pass the 
Kantian test of universality and necessity. As a result, claims made in this fashion would be 
subject to more rigorous testing by including these “accidental” features in the account itself. As a 
new method in Continental philosophy, Depraz thus suggests an exciting new program for 
research, one that—though she does not develop the notion much here—might do better than 
authors have traditionally in accounting for the peculiarities of race, gender, and other 
“contingent” social categories that characterize how we must all lead our lives in social space. 
If Depraz’s essay makes a case for the utility of Ricœur’s thought for Continental 
philosophy, the final two essays make the case for Ricœur’s utility to Anglo-American 
discussions. Chapter eleven, Geoffrey Dierckxsens’ “Ricœur’s Take on Embodied Cognition and 
Imagination: Enactivism in Light of Freedom and Nature” argues that Ricœur’s work may be 
understood as a contribution to the field of cognitive research. The questions at play here include 
the following: How are we to understand cognition? What role does embodiment play (if any) in 
characterizing our thoughts? Just how is human cognition different from (or like) that of animals? 
Dierckxsens makes the case that Ricœur develops an account of embodied cognition in Freedom 
and Nature which is best characterized as “enactivist,” that is, it is one which defines cognition as 
an interaction between body and the physical world, and not in terms of inner mental 
representations. What Ricœur’s account adds to this discussion is that he develops the role of 
imagination in a way that accounts for the non-linguistic features of thought. Thus, his approach 
makes better sense of animal cognition than rival accounts. 
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In the twelfth and final chapter “Freedom and Resentment and Ricœur: Toward a 
Normative-Narrative Theory of Agency,” Adam Graves argues for a critical integration of Ricœur 
and Strawson’s work on freedom and responsibility. The question “Are humans free?” is usually 
approached metaphysically and later tied to questions of responsibility. Many approaches thus 
prefer to change the metaphysical picture to allow for a notion of responsibility which is 
compatible with some sort of determinism. Strawson argued that it would be better instead to 
understand responsibility on purely normative grounds, ignoring its relation to metaphysical 
claims. He does this by arguing that certain sorts of claims are directly second-personal (rather 
than merely third-personal.) Graves argues that this approach is helpful for avoiding 
metaphysical traps in Ricœur’s thought. Yet, Ricœur’s thought is needed to make sense of 
second-personal appeals, since the contexts of imputation are not vacuums, but parts of a larger 
narrative. In this way, Ricœur’s sense of the imputability of actions develops Strawson’s account 
to make sense of responsibility without appealing to metaphysical conceptions of freedom. 
Final Thoughts 
I would like now to note an ongoing wish that I had in reviewing the volume, a sort of 
unreasonable moment that asks for too much. I wish only that the volume had reached out a bit 
more to the ongoing concerns the philosophy of race and gender, or non-Western philosophy, 
such as Latin American or African philosophy. Davidson himself, of course, is no stranger to this 
sort of endeavor, having already edited volumes that do work in this vein, and he has developed 
his own proposal for an “Intersectional Hermeneutics” which aims to take hermeneutics down 
exactly this path (2016.) Even in this volume Depraz suggests some developments in this 
direction. What I suppose I wanted was to see the ways in which the project of Freedom and 
Nature could be completed through a dialogue about, for example, raced embodiment or the 
concerns that Gloria Anzaldúa raises about leading a life in the borderlands, split by geographical 
circumstance—perhaps a different sort of involuntary than that which Ricœur takes up. 
Nevertheless, what I hope the above review does show is that Davidson’s volume turns 
out to be more than a companion to Ricœur’s Freedom and Nature; it is a sort of referendum on the 
continued relevance of Ricœur’s thought to contemporary philosophy. For it not only provides 
ample resources to understand the arguments in the work, an “internal” interest for scholars of 
Ricœur and hermeneutics, each essay also appeals to interests in our broader philosophical 
discussions. With respect to this latter “external” set of interests, moreover, its goal is not 
narrowly conceived, since the essays in the volume address ongoing concerns both in Continental 
philosophy, including discussions of embodiment, habit, life, and subjectivity, and in Anglo-
American philosophy, including problems concerning intentionality, embodied-cognition, mind-
body dualism, freedom of the will, and responsibility. It would be unreasonable to ask for 
anything more from a single volume, and the result stands as a tribute to the collective efforts on 
the part of all the contributors. 
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